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DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND JUVENILE LAW
BARBARA L. SHAPIRO*

No survey of developments in New Mexico domestic relations law
has ever been published in this law review. Instead, the law review has
customarily contained articles on topics of special relevance to the
domestic relations field. Juvenile law, in contrast, has been surveyed
from this broad perspective. This article will therefore focus primarily
on developments in domestic relations law, and will include discussion
of these recent developments in general terms and references to further reading. Recent juvenile law will also be surveyed, but more
briefly, since many of the recent cases in juvenile law were discussed
in the last issue.'
I. DOMESTIC RELATIONS

A. Conflict of Laws.
One line of recent decisions in the domestic relations field exposes
some problems peculiar to New Mexico concerning the conflict of
laws arising out of the division of property upon divorce. These cases
are the progeny of the well-known Hughes v. Hughes decision.2 In
1978, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Hughes decided that where
there is substantial property in New Mexico to be divided and characterized in a divorce proceeding and where most of the property can be
traced to property acquired in a common-law state, the court will apply the law of the common-law state to decide the characterization
and extent of each party's interest in or right to the property. The
characterization of the property by the court under the law of that
state, according to Hughes, must take into account the applicable law
of the other state, including all the inchoate rights, incidents of ownership, claims, other rights and legal relations of both spouses under
that state's law. The New Mexico Supreme Court thereby developed
a conflict of laws rule to protect the spouses in a divorce where most
*Associate, Poole, Tinnin & Martin, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. See Children'sRight Symposium, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 235-429 (1980).
2. 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978).
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or all of the property involved is traceable to separate property acquired in a common-law jurisdiction. 3
The Hughes formula creates difficult problems for the attorneys
representing the parties in such cases. Under Hughes, the attorneys
must research the law of the other state and guess what the courts
there would have done with the property under the relevant circumstances. They must also be prepared to litigate the issue and to consider the tendency of a New Mexico court to treat all property acquired during marriage as if it were community property. Because the
court's principal aim in these cases is to protect each spouse at dissolution of marriage, the court will apply the law of the other state
consistent with the principle stated in Hughes that the basic level of
inquiry is the purpose to be achieved by the litigation."
The Hughes approach was applied, for example, in the recent case
of Stephens v. Stephens.' The issue before the supreme court in
Stephens was the characterization and division of military retirement
benefits. The court held that the law of the "home state" or domicile
formally designated by the military employee would be applied to
characterize the property, regardless of where the serviceman actually
resided when the benefits were earned. In Stephens, the state designated by Colonel Stephens was Tennessee. The New Mexico court
held that a Tennessee court, applying Tennessee law, would have
divided marital property as it deemed "equitable," considering the
wife's contributions to the care, production, and maintenance of the
husband's estate, the care of the children, the relative financial conditions of the parties, and any relevant misconduct. The result was that
the court, applying Tennessee law, awarded one-half of Colonel
Stephen's retirement benefits to his wife; in effect, the court treated
his retirement benefits as if they were community property.
The court continued to follow the Hughes approach in Brenholdt
v. Brenholdt,I which resolved the issue of what law applies in determining rights in property located in several states. In the process,
however, the court ignored potential problems that could arise from
3. For a more complete analysis of Hughes v. Hughes, see Note, In-Migration of Couples
from Common-law Jurisdictions:Protecting the Wife at Dissolution of Marriage, 9 N.M.L.
Rev. 113 (1978-79). The court in Hughes was careful to point out that California had a
more direct approach to the problem through its quasi-community property statute. 91
N.M. at 346, 573 P.2d at 1201.
4. 91 N.M. at 345-47, 573 P.2d 1200-02. Rule44 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure requires the issue of foreign law to be pleaded or raised by some other form of notice,
and also provides that the ordinary rules of evidence do not apply when the court is making
its determination of foreign law. The court's ruling on foreign law is deemed an issue of law,
subject to the broader scope of appellate review applicable to issues of law.
5. 93 N.M. 1, 595 P.2d 1196 (1979).
6.
-N.M.
, 612 P.2d 1300 (1980).
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the application of some traditional conflict of laws rules regarding
the property located in these states.7 The New Mexico rule of characterizing property by tracing the funds used to purchase it to the
time of acquisition thus creates convoluted and confusing guesswork
for both attorneys and the courts when the search ends in funds and
property acquired outside New Mexico. A quasi-community property
statute might relieve some of these difficulties. 8
The extent to which a New Mexico court will strain to validate
lengthy cohabitation in New Mexico by recognizing a common-law
marriage under the law of another state was demonstrated recently in
the case of In re Estate of Willard.9 In Willard, the court of appeals
affirmed a district court decision which held that two people living
together in New Mexico for ten years, one of whom had been married
and divorced from another spouse during the ten-year period, were
common-law spouses under Texas law, even though they were domiciled in New Mexico the entire time. The court found that the Willards had entered into an agreement to live as husband and wife in
Texas and had satisfied other Texas requirements for a valid commonlaw marriage based on their visits to Texas five or six times a year.
When one spouse died, the other had a valid claim against the New

Mexico estate of the deceased spouse because the marriage in Texas
was also valid in New Mexico under traditional conflict of laws rules.
In Brister v. Brister,' 0 the New Mexico Supreme Court continued
to take a traditional approach to the conflict of laws when it confirmed that New Mexico courts will apply New Mexico law in determining the modification of alimony, regardless of where the parties
7. In Brenholdt, real property had been acquired in Arizona and New Mexico with community earnings while the spouses resided in New Mexico. Previously, while in Ohio, they
had acquired property in Ohio and California with separate earnings. The supreme court
held that New Mexico law would apply to determine their rights to the property in Arizona
and New Mexico; Ohio law would determine their rights to the property in Ohio and California. The court did not address or reconcile the traditional conflict of laws rule which
states that the law of the state of the situs of real property controls in deciding questions of
title and ownership. The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws takes the traditional
view that the law of the situs of real property exclusively governs with respect to the rights
of the parties. R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 398-99 (2d ed. 1980).
The New Mexico court also failed to address the issue of whether a New Mexico decision
would be enforceable against the property acquired in Arizona. It is unclear if an award of
title to real property in a divorce decree of one state is always enforceable in another state
where the real property is located. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); see also R. Weintraub, supra, at 404-08.
8. California's quasi-community property statute still requires a California court to look
at whether the property would have been community property if it had been acquired in the
same manner with the same funds and the parties had been living and working in California.
Cal. Civ. Code § 4803 (Supp. 1980).
9. 93 N.M. 352, 600 P.2d 298 (Ct. App. 1979).
10. 92 N.M. 711,594 P.2d 1167 (1979).
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are living. The court in Brister held that if the original alimony award
has been made by a New Mexico court, even though the wife is living
out of state with another man and her state of domicile has different
standards for modification, New Mexico law will control to modify
the award. The court did not inquire into which state had the most
significant interest. Instead, its decision implied that the location of
the court originally awarding alimony is the controlling factor. I The
court also held that, under New Mexico law, evidence of the effect of
contributions from a cohabiting male upon the financial need of the
divorced wife could be included to show the changed circumstances
needed to modify alimony.
The enforceability of foreign judgments in the domestic relations
field was also the subject of recent cases. Full faith and credit was
granted to an Indiana divorce decree by the supreme court in Barker
v. Barker1 2 notwithstanding an objection that was raised concerning
personal jurisdiction. In Barker, the issue was whether a foreign decree should be given full faith and credit where service was made
upon a New Mexico respondent under an Indiana court rule and not
under a statute enacted by the Indiana Legislature. The court found
that the decree was entitled to full faith and credit if there were minimum contacts and notice adequate to satisfy the due process clause
of the United States Constitution. Since the Indiana trial rule regarding long-arm service had been tested in Indiana and found constitutional, the court held that New Mexico was obligated to give the judicial rule the effect of law. In addition, the court found that if full
faith and credit was expressly given to a foreign judgment in a final
order of a New Mexico court, the order could be amended more than
30 days after its entry to reduce it to a domestic judgment enforceable in New Mexico under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
When the enforcement of a foreign judgment based on a claim for
alienation of affections is opposed, a public policy argument may be
effective, as is shown by the recent case of Thompson v. Chapman. 1 3
The court of appeals held in Thompson that there was no claim for
alienation of affections if an estrangement resulted in divorce. The
court announced that it would abolish the remedy for damages based
11. In contrast, if the wife was living in New Mexico and the husband in another state,
and the wife attempted to enforce her alimony award through the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-6-1 to -41 (1978), the applicable
law in determining the duty of husband's support would probably be the other state's law as
the responding state under section 40-6-7.
12. 94 N.M. 162, 608 P.2d 138 (1980).
13. 93 N.M. 356, 600 P.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1979).
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upon alienation of affections, if it had the power, because the claim,
in its opinion, was no longer viable.1"
B. Spousal Support and PropertyDivision.
Prior to 1979, New Mexico decisions addressing property issues in
a divorce frequently involved tangled factual and legal questions of
characterization, evaluation, and division. In particular there were
questions concerning the appropriate characterization and evaluation
of interests in farms, houses, businesses, and professional practices.
More general treatment was given to issues of spousal support. The
appellate courts usually reiterated the legal standards for granting alimony or affirmed an alimony award as being within the discretion of
the trial court. 1 Thus, before 1979 there was little New Mexico precedent establishing factual parameters for an inadequate award of alimony. 1 6 During 1979 and 1980, New Mexico courts began to structure an approach to this issue. Controversial and significant decisions
were made in the area of property division as well, particularly with
respect to the evaluation of professional practices and the clarification
of proof standards for community and separate property characterization. Since the close of the Survey year, significant cases in the area
of property division and spousal support were decided by the courts.
They will be discussed briefly here and surveyed more fully in subsequent issues.
Perhaps the most controversial recent decision in the area of property division concerned the evaluation of a professional practice in
Hurley v. Hurley. 1 7 In Hurley, the supreme court held that, although
a medical license could not be deemed an item of community property divisible upon divorce, the goodwill of a medical practice growing out of the use of the license was divisible as community property,
14. At least twenty-five states have abolished the claim for alienation of affections by
statute: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be Justified Today?, 56 N.
Dak. L. Rev. 239, 247 (1980). In a recent case, the State of Washington judicially abolished
it. See Wyman v. Wallace, __Wash. -_, 615 P.2d 452 (1980).
15. See Michelson v. Michelson, 86 N.M. 107, 110, 520 P.2d 263, 266 (1974);Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357 (1972).
16. In contrast, California appellate courts over the past decade defined such factual
parameters in cases where there was also a substantial property division. A useful analysis of
the California decisions up to 1978 can be found in Fain, The Effect of Property Distribution on Spousal Support in California,5 Community Prop. J. 187 (1978). More recent decisions in California concerning alimony are discussed in another context in Gillman, Alimonyl
Spousal Support: From Punishment to Rehabilitation, 7 Community Prop. J. 135 (1980).
17.

-. N.M. __,

615 P.2d 256 (1980).
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even though it was not readily saleable and was difficult to evaluate.' 1
New Mexico thus follows a line of California decisions with similar
holdings. I9
In Portillo v. Shappie,2 0 the court of appeals followed a previous
line of decisions in New Mexico holding that a community lien on
separate property is limited only to the actual sums invested and the
value of community labor.2 1 The facts in Portillo highlight the inequities that may result from this rule.2 2
The lesson to be learned from Higginbotham v. Higginbotham2" is
that former spouses should avoid subsequent oral modifications of
the division of property in a divorce decree. The divorce decree stated
that the money from the sale of a residence should be divided equally
after the divorce, but the parties then orally agreed, subsequent to
the divorce, to use the funds to repair a second house. One of them
relied on the agreement and used the funds for that purpose. The supreme court held that under these circumstances, the oral agreement
constituted a new contract, which replaced the terms of the original
decree. The oral agreement discharged the original judgment and could
be specifically enforced under the doctrine of part performance.
A new method of evaluating the community property interest in a
profit-sharing plan was endorsed by the supreme court in the recent
case of Ridgway v. Ridgway.2 4 Periodic payments under a promis18. "Goodwill" under this decision appeared to be equated with a professional's superior
earning power. Some of the factors considered by the court in evaluating goodwill, for example, were the length of time the professional had practiced, his or her success, age, and
health, the past profits of the practice, and the practice's fixed resources.
19. See In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974);Golden
v. Golden, 270 CaL App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969). A line of Texas decisions holding differently is discussed in Welch, Discovery and Valuation in a Divorce Division Involving
a Cosely-Held Business or ProfessionalPractice, 7 Community Prop. J. 103, 118-19 (1980).
The issue of the evaluation and nature of professional goodwill is fully discussed in Adams,
Is Professional Goodwill Divisible Community Property?, 6 Community Prop. J. 61 (1979).
20. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 604 (Ct. App. July 3, 1980).
21. Id. See McElyea v. McElyea, 49 N.M. 322, 163 P.2d 635 (1945); Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944).
22. In Portillo, a house brought into the marriage by the wife doubled in size and increased in value from $8,500 to $33,400 in significant part because of improvements made
with community funds. The community lien on the house, however, was only $2,800, or the
sums originally invested in materials and hired labor. The court determined that N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 40-3-8(C) (1978), which states that the rents, profits, and issues of separate property
are also separate property, was consistent with the view that the community was not entitled
to a share in the increased value of the house caused by the improvements. No offset was
allowed for the rental value of the property which was used as a residence. The court stated
that because neither husband nor wife could be excluded from the other's dwelling, the
rental offset would be against public policy. This decision appears to limit prior case law
holding a rental offset valid. See Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010 (1944).
23. 92 N.M. 412, 589 P.2d 196 (1979).
24. 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980). Profit-sharing plans could be appropriately evaluated, the court held, by using the undiscounted, current actual dollar value of the vested
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sory note to effect an equal division of community property, secured
by a lien on the separate property of the maker of the note, was also
held appropriate and not deemed payment of alimony.
Finally, the court of appeals directly addressed the problematic
issue of transmutation of community property under section 47-1-16

of the New Mexico statutes. In the case of In re Estate of Fletcher,2"

interest in the plan. Defined benefit plans, on the other hand, could appropriately use the
discounted "present value" method employed by accountants, the court said. Attorneys
should be aware that the valuation and division of pension plans is an area full of uncertainty.
A good, general article on pension plans is Hardie & Reisman, Employee Benefit Plans and
Divorce: Type of Plan, Date of Retirement, and Income Tax Consequences as Factors in
Dispositions, 5 Community Prop. J. 179 (1978); see also Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
Providing economic protection for one spouse when all the pension benefits are in the name
of the other spouse is full of risk, moreover. The IRS has recently held in a private letter
ruling that a plan may be forfeited in a separate property state under the anti-alienation provision of I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) if attached to pay support arrearages under a court order and
the participant is not in pay status. I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No.
8010051 (Dec. 12, 1979). In a community property state where there is a division of property on divorce, however, one-half of the benefits from a self-employed spouse's Keogh plan
may be transferred to another Keogh plan on behalf of the other spouse without jeopardizing
the tax exempt status of the plan or creating income tax consequences at the time of the
transfer. I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 8014082 (Jan. 11, 1980).
However, while I.R.S. Letter Ruling Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 8009103 (Dec. 10, 1979)
states that a division of several individual plans as part of an equal division of community
property will not result in income until distributions are made to the holder of the plan, and
then will only result in income to the holder, transferring a plan entirely to one spouse may
result in income to the other spouse when benefits are distributed under I.R.S. Letter Ruling
Rep. (CCH), Letter Ruling No. 7952045 (Sept. 25, 1979). A short but pertinent discussion
of the tax aspects of dividing pension plans is presented in a newly revised and updated work.
M. Walker, Tax Consequences of Divorce in New Mexico 41 (1979) (copies are available
through the New Mexico Society of Certified Public Accountants). If an attorney looks to
Social Security benefits as a form of economic protection, the attorney should recall that if
the parties are married for ten years or more, a former wife is entitled to one-half of the
social security benefits of her former husband, provided that she does not remarry. She cannot receive any of them, however, until she is at least 62 and her former husband is entitled
to and is receiving benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(I)(A)-(B) (1976).
, 615 P.2d
-, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, __ N.M. __
25. ___N.M.
991 (1980). Ordinarily, transmutation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952). Where community real property is
held in joint tenancy, however, the court found that section 47-1-16 changed this proof requirement to a preponderance of the evidence and made a joint tenancy deed prima facie
evidence of transmutation. The court noted recent authority in support of its decision in
Bingaman, The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-Legislative
History, 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1974). Other cases were distinguished by the court on the ground
that they concerned the source of funds and hence the character of the property, not transmutation of the property. See Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d 699
(1963); Shanafelt v. Holloman, 61 N.M. 147, 296 P.2d 752 (1956). In the recent case of
Corley v. Corley, 92 N.M. 716, 594 P.2d 1172 (1979), where a deed was mistakenly filled
out by a realty company in joint tenancy to husband and wife, an approach was taken similar to these other cases to avoid the effect of section 47-1-16. The court found that the
property involved had been purchased with the separate funds of one spouse and was not
community property before the joint tenancy deed was signed. The clear and convincing evidence standard was applied to negate any claim of transmutation from separate property to
community property before the signing of the deed. The court also found that the deed did
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the court held that, to overcome the presumption of community
property applicable to property acquired during marriage, a party
not only had the burden of going forward with the evidence, but also
had the burden of persuading the court that the property was that
2
party's separate property, not community property. 6
In 1980, for the first time, the supreme court squarely addressed
the adequacy of an alimony award in the dissolution of a long-term
marriage where there was substantial community property. In Hurley
v. Hurley,2 7 the supreme court held that it was an abuse of discretion
for a district court to award only $1,000 a month alimony to a 49year-old wife who had been married for 25 years, when the earning
capacity of the wife was $15,000 a year, the earning capacity of the
husband was $121,000 a year, and the community property, though
extensive, was not liquid. The court explained that the wife should
not be required to sell her share of property to meet daily expenses,
and that she had demonstrated both a greater need than was met by
the $1,000 award and the husband's ability to pay.2 I
The limitations of settlement agreements concerning alimony and
the court's absolute power over the modification of alimony were reasserted in the recent case of Brister v. Brister.29 The court held in
Brister that it could ignore a private settlement agreement specifying
the amount and term of alimony once it was incorporated into a divorce decree, and could subsequently modify the original alimony
award on the basis of need and ability to pay. Support contributed
by a person cohabiting with the former spouse, however, could be
considered.
Additionally, in In re Estate of Lord3 0 an oral ante-nuptial contract was held void because it contained an agreement to marry for
which the consideration was care and support. Parties cannot by
not even vest the property in the parties as joint tenants because the wife had paid no consideration. Moreover, commingling of separate funds in a bank account did not create a
transmutation of separate property to community property unless the separate property was
unable to be traced.
26. Cancelled checks from a separate bank account were not necessary to satisfy this
burden of proof. A simple reconciliation of deposits and expenditures from the bank account with supporting testimony were deemed sufficient.
27.

-N.M.

-_, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).

2& The wife also was awarded $500 per month in child support. The supreme court thus
followed the California cases which hold it an abuse of discretion to fail to award substantial
alimony to the wife in a long-term marriage where there is a significant disparity in income
and little liquid community property. See discussion in the authorities cited in note 16
supra. The award of attorney's fees to the wife in Hurley was also held inadequate and the
issue remanded for reconsideration, taking into account the attorney's actual accounting figures. Appellate fees and costs were also awarded to the wife.
29. 92 N.M. 711, 594 P.2d 1167 (1979).
30. 93 N.M. 543, 602 P.2d 1030 (1979).
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agreement alter their legal relations. Because the duty of care and
support was binding upon the parties by virtue of their marriage, the
agreement was unsupported by consideration, was against public policy, and could not be specifically enforced.
C Child Support.
The New Mexico Supreme Court placed a limitation on child support awards made in connection with a divorce in the final episode of
Spingola v. Spingola," 1 when the court decided that a New Mexico
divorce decree could not impose an obligation of post-minority child
support. Although the settlement agreement involved in Spingola required post-minority support in the form of contributions for a college education, the court construed the child support statute 2 to
mean that the court's subject matter jurisdiction over child support
ends when the child reaches majority. It held that the court's jurisdiction cannot be extended by the terms of a settlement agreement
incorporated into a divorce decree.3 3 The court did not consider,
however, whether a separate agreement concerning post-minority
support and not incorporated into a decree can be enforced under a
contractual theory.
A recent New Mexico case concerning federal child support excluded consideration of a stepfather's income in determining a
mother's eligibility for benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter AFDC] .31 In Barela v. New Mexico Department of Human Services,3 s the court of appeals held that the
stepfather's income could not be presumed to be available for purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC support because a stepfather who has not adopted his stepchild has no obligation under
New Mexico law to support the child. Under federal regulations, a
if it was "actually
stepfather's income could be considered, however,
3
available for current use on a regular basis." 6
31. 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708 (1979). The first Spingola case can be found at 91 N.M.
737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-7 (1978).
33. See similar decisions from other states in Annot., 99 A. L. R. 3d 322 (1980). The general standards for child support established in the well-known, first Spingola case are more
thoroughly analyzed inNote: GuidelinesforModification of Child Support Awards: Spingola
v. Spingola, 9 N.M.L. Rev. 201 (1978-79).
34. 42 U.S.C. § § 601-662 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
N.M. -, 614
35. 94 N.M. 288, 609 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, __
P.2d 546 (1980).
609 P.2d at 1247 (emphasis in original). The Barela opinion was
36. 94 N.M. at -,
consistent with the opinion of the Tenth Circuit issued in the same year. Nolan v. C. de
Baca, 603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2927 (1980). The two opinions are inconsistent however, with Duran v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 19 N.M.
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The court further developed standards for determining the right to
AFDC benefits in New Mexico Department of Human Services v.
Garcia.' I Affirming the New Mexico Department of Human Services'
interpretation of Regulation 221.722, the supreme court held that
evidence of a natural father's voluntary payments toward the support
of his illegitimate children, his acknowledgement of paternity, and
the evidence of his long-term relationships with the children found in
the record considered as a whole meant that the father's contributions would be considered to determine the mother's eligibility for
AFDC benefits.
Lastly, the "AFDC Recipient Work Incentive Act," 3 8 which became law in 1980, funds a pilot program3 I that provides day care for
children both of former welfare recipients who become gainfully employed and of employed persons eligible for welfare. House Bill 77,40
on the other hand, which would have provided a state tax credit
based on day care costs for families earning less than $12,000 per
year, died in the Senate Finance Committee.
D. Child Custody, Visitation, and Guardianship.
Perhaps the most significant, though most confusing, recent decision in the area of child custody was Schuermann v. Schuermann.4
In Schuermann, a father was awarded custody of his two male children long after a divorce decree had awarded custody to the mother.
The change of custody was based upon a showing of changed circumstances and a showing that it was in the best interests of the children.
The correct test for determining a change of custody from the mother
to the father was at issue. The supreme court stated that, contrary to
the mother's argument which had some support in earlier cases, 4 2 it
is not necessary for a father to prove that the integrity, morality, and
character of a mother has changed so that the children are no longer
receiving proper care.
Ironically, while the court affirmed the "best interests of the child"
test and rejected the alternative test urged by the mother because it
St. B. Bull. 340 (Ct. App. April 17, 1980), where such income was considered because it was
community property. Duran was recently reversed by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 19
N.M. St. B. Bull 963 (October 16, 1980). Community property principles cannot be applied,
the court held, to conflict with controlling federal regulations which preempt the field, even
though a spouse has a vested right to one-half of the other spouse's income under New Mexico community property law.
37. 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 27-2-37 to -40 (Supp. 1980).
39. The Act provided $500,000 to set up the pilot program.
40. H.R. 77, 34th Legis., 2d Sess. (1980).
41. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 253 (March 20, 1980).
42. SeeIn re Briggs, 91 N.M. 84, 570 P.2d 915 (1977).
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would cause contesting parents to "promulgate each other's negative
the court held that the "morality, character or integqualities," '4
rity" standard is still relevant in determining the capacity of the custodial parent and whether this capacity has changed sufficiently to
require a change of custody. Contesting parents thus will continue to
"promulgate each other's negative qualities."
Schuermann did, however, clarify the supreme court's position on
awarding attorney's fees in change of custody cases. Where a custody
contest develops, and the financial resources of the contesting parents
differ substantially, the more affluent parent will be ordered to pay
part or all of the less affluent parent's costs and attorney's fees. It is
expected that this holding will have a more serious effect upon working fathers if the family structure is traditional.
Recent decisions also addressed procedural questions in the area of
custody and guardianship. In Thatcher v. Arnall,4 4 the probate court
was found to have no subject matter jurisdiction in guardianship
cases. The court held that only the children's court and the district
court have concurrent jurisdiction to decide these questions.
The validity of a contempt order based on a violation of visitation
rights was explored in the recent case of Baker v. Baker." s The father
in Baker was a serviceman who had custody of his child. Notice was
served upon him in Germany of a contempt action filed against him
in New Mexico for failure to abide by the visitation provisions in his
divorce decree. Although a notice to stay was filed under the Soldier
and Sailor's Relief Act,4 6 the contempt sanction against him was held
valid because the father did not demonstrate that he had requested
and been refused leave to present his case in court. The court also
noted that no personal jurisdiction over the child is required for a
court to hold the father in contempt in a case concerning visitation.
An attempt to enact the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
failed during the 1979 New Mexico Legislative Session. New Mexico
is now one of only four states which have not adopted the Uniform
Act.4 ' The State Board of Bar Commissioners, however, has approved
a new draft of the Act for consideration by the 1981 Legislature.4 8
43. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 254.

44. 94 N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193 (1980).
45. 93 N.M. 463, 601 P.2d 433 (1979).
46. 50 U.S.C. App. § § 501-548, 560-574 (1976).
47. See 9 U.L.A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Supp. 1980). The Act is re-

viewed in Annot., 96 A.L.R.3d 968 (1979). The states which have not yet adopted the Act
are New Mexico, West Virginia, Massachusetts and South Carolina. The District of Columbia,
the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico also have not adopted it.
48. Telephone conversation with M. Lynch, Member of the Joint Committee on Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, October 3, 1980.
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A new statute 4 9 provides that reasonable visitation provisions for
grandparents may be included in a divorce decree or be granted within
six months after entry of a divorce decree. These visitation rights can
be required if the court finds that visits by the grandparents are in
the best interests of the child.
II. JUVENILE LAW
A. Child Abuse and Neglect.
An expected constitutional attack on the child abuse and neglect
statute' 0 was defeated by the court of appeals in Health and Social
Services Department v. Natural Fatherand Natural Mother."' Two
mentally retarded parents whose children were subjects of a neglect
proceeding challenged the statute on the constitutional ground of
vagueness. They contended that the relevant definition of a neglected
child5 2 was so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence could not
guess its meaning. The court of appeals held that the statutory language gave adequate notice and that simple differences of opinion
about the meaning of the words do not make the statute vague. The
court followed other jurisdictions which have upheld the constitutionality of similarly worded statutes.5 I The court also affirmed the
factual findings, which supported by clear and convincing evidence
the conclusion that the children were neglected.
The criteria for terminating a mentally ill mother's parental rights,
due to child neglect, were set out by the court of appeals in Health
and Social Services Department v. Smith. 14 The mother's lack of fitness as a parent had been proved as required by section 40-7-4(A)(3)
of the New Mexico statutes.' 5 The court of appeals held that evidence that the child was dependent and neglected by the mother satisfied the statute.5 6 The appellate court pointed out that a district
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-9-1 to -4 (Supp. 1980).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 32-1-3(L), -34(A) (1978).
51. 18 N.M. St. B. BulL 670 (Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1979).
52. The definition under attack in the statute described a neglected child as one lacking
proper parental care and control or other care and control necessary to his well-being because
of the faults or habits of his parents or because of their neglect to provide them; or a child
whose parents cannot discharge their duties because of mental incapacity. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 32-1-3(L)(2), (3) (1978).
53. See Minor Children of F. B. v. Caruthers, 323 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959);
In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975); In re Neglected Child, 130 Vt. 525, 296
A.2d 250 (1972). See also Vorholt, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes Ter.
minating ParentalRights, 1980 Duke L.J. No. 2 at 350.
54. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 138 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1979).
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-7-4(A)(3) (1978).
56. The findings were: 1) the mother failed to perform the natural and legal obligations
of care and support due to mental illness; 2) the child had been subjected to mental or emotional harm; 3) the mother's illness was continuing; and 4) such continuing illness would
cause the child further harm.
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court is not required to make independent findings of the four statutory elements concerning parental neglect; the only necessary finding
is that the parent is unfit. The court held that the findings in the district court order were fully supported by the evidence.' '
In an attempt to provide official police protection in cases of
abuse, a new statute5 8 gives police the express power to intervene in
domestic disturbances. Under this law, the police may make an arrest
without a warrant, given probable cause to believe an assault and battery upon a family member has occurred. The statute protects spouses
as well as children. The peace officer may also remain with the victim,
assist the victim in getting to a shelter, or help the victim obtain
proper medical attention.' 9
B. Delinquents and Children in Need of Supervision (CHINS).
The 1972 New Mexico Children's Code, which is applicable to delinquency and CHINS (children in need of supervision) cases, was
thoroughly surveyed by this law review in 1976.60 Another recent
article has examined problems arising out of conflicts between the
1972 Code and the 1976 Children's Court Rules as revised in 1978.61
Procedural and constitutional issues not discussed in these articles,
however, have been the subject of several recent cases.
Courts have imposed and enforced strict application of time limits
under the Children's Code and Children's Court Rules in recent cases.
Motions to extend custody at an institution were refused and a child
was released when the 30-day period required for a hearing had
elapsed. 6 2 The procedural rules for an adjudicatory hearing were held
applicable to motions to extend custody and were strictly applied by
the court. Similarly, a petition for delinquency was dismissed when a
57. It is to be expected that in cases involving Indian. children, neglect and abuse proceedings, termination of parental rights and adoptions will be considerably more complicated
and may require deferral to an Indian tribal court on grounds of primary jurisdiction under
the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § § 1901-63 (Supp. 1979). See Wamser, Child
Welfare Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A New Mexico Focus, 10 N.M.L. Rev.
413 (1980).
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-7 (Supp. 1980).
59. Id. § 31-1-7(C).
60. Children's Court procedure in these cases under the 1972 Children's Code was thoroughly explored in Harris, Children'sCourt Practice in Delinquency andNeed of Supervision
Cases under the New Rules, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 331 (1975).
61. See Lauer, The New Mexico hildren's Code: Some Remaining Problems, 10 N.M.L.
Rev. 341 (1980). This article discusses recent cases through 1979 in terms of conflicts in
time limits for commencing certain procedures; problems of admissions of guilt in consent
decrees; waiver of the child's right to counsel; the parent's right to counsel; the use of admissions and confessions; the confusing standard for litigating the child's need for care and rehabilitation; disposition and proportional sanctions; the standard for transfer to the district
court for criminal prosecution; and confidentiality problems concerning delinquency and
neglect proceedings.
62. State v. Doe, 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 140 (Ct. App. Feb. 14, 1980).
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child who had admitted committing the delinquent act in question
was held for more than four days following a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, and disposition of his case had not been made within
75 days. 63 The court in this case construed the statute and ordered
the dismissal consistent with the underlying statutory intent that
children's court matters must be handled promptly. In another case,
hearings on a petition to revoke probation did not occur within 30
64
days, and the petition was dismissed.
Recent cases also delineated the standing and power of certain
officials in children's court proceedings. A probation parole officer
was found to have authority to file a petition for extension of parole
supervision. 6 s Special masters, however, have no power to hear petitions to revoke probation without prior approval by the New Mexico
66
Supreme Court.
In addition to the cases interpreting and applying time limits and
the power of officials, several important decisions clarified constitutional issues of the rights of children. In State v. Montoya, 6 1 the
children's court dismissed with prejudice a delinquency petition based
on allegations of vehicular homicide, reckless driving, and driving
while intoxicated. Subsequently, an indictment reinstating the same
charges was filed in district court. The court of appeals held that no
double jeopardy claim lay where the original dismissal was based on a
finding of lack of jurisdiction in the children's court.
The fourth amendment was held to apply to a child and was held
violated when a medical exam was taken by a doctor at the State
Juvenile Detention Home without the child's consent. 68 Motions to
suppress the evidence could be made before trial as well as during
trial; moreover, failure to file a pre-adjudicatory motion to suppress
did not constitute a waiver of the child's right to move to exclude
the evidence.
The constitutional right to a trial by jury was also held applicable
to children's court proceedings and was not waived by the child's
failure to demand a jury trial within 10 days as required by statute. 6 9
The court held, consistent with the standard applied in adult felony
cases, that waiver must be intelligent and express. 7 0
63. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 31, 595 P.2d 1221 (Ct. App. 1979).
64. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 621, 603 P.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1979).
65. State v. Doe, 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 241 (Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1979).
66. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 621, 603 P.2d 731 (Ct. App. 1979).
67. 93 N.M. 346, 600 P.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1979).
68. State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 143, 597 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1979).
69. State v. Doe,94 N.M. 637, 614 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App. 1980). The statutory provision
involved was N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-31(A) (1978).
70. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). The problem of intelligent
waiver by a child is discussed in connection with the waiver of Miranda rights in Harris, Chil-
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CONCLUSION
Recent New Mexico cases have addressed significant problems in
the areas of domestic and juvenile law. The cases clarified, among
others, issues concerning awarding attorney's fees in change of child
custody cases, evaluating pension plans, proving transmutation of
community property, and evaluating professional practices. The constitutionality of the child neglect statute also was upheld. New precedent established more definite criteria for determining adequate alimony awards upon divorce. The constitutional right to trial by jury
was held applicable to cases in the children's court. Recent decisions
also revealed some continuing problems in deciding conflict of laws
issues involving property divisions upon divorce and in applying the
standards for a change in child custody. The 1981 Legislature may be
the forum for resolving some of the problems in these areas arising
under present New Mexico law.

dren's Waiver of Miranda Rights and the Supreme Court's Decisions in Parham, Bellottiand
Fare, 10 N.M.L. Rev. 379 (1980).

